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It’s Elementary
A Monthly Column by EFAP Director John Yinger
July 2014
The Final Verdict on STAR?
As readers of this column know, my colleagues and I have been conducting research on
New York’s School Tax Relief Program, STAR, for many years. The latest version of this
research has been accepted for publication in a professional journal. 1 This column reports on our
key findings.
The feature of STAR that makes it interesting to scholars is that it alters the tax-price of
school services and therefore encourages more school spending. 2 People cannot select the
quality of school services individually but must instead vote for the level of school spending they
prefer. As many scholars have shown, a household’s vote depends on, among other things, the
“tax price” it faces. A household’s tax price is the increase in its property taxes that is required
to buy another unit of school quality. A tax-price works like any other price: a lower tax price
leads to a higher demand for school services and to more spending.
Without STAR a homeowner’s property tax payment, T, is the district’s property tax rate,
t, multiplied by the homeowner’s assessed value, V; that is, T = tV. With STAR, the homeowner
only pays taxes on the value of their house above a certain amount, say X, so their payment
becomes TS = t(V – X) = tV(1 – X/V). Adding STAR, therefore, is like multiplying their
original payment by (1 – X/V). In other words, X/V represents the proportional decline in the
price of school services for this homeowner. If X = $30,000, for example, which it is for most
homeowners in New York, and if V = $150,000, then the STAR lowers the price of school
services by 30,000/150,000 = 0.2 = 20 percent. In this example, we can also say that the STAR
lowers the local share of additional property taxes from 100 to 80 percent.
In 2011, the district local tax share associated with STAR ranged from 42.9 percent to
93.4 percent, using median house value in the district as a base. In other words, some districts
experienced a price decline above 50 percent, whereas others saw a decline of less than 10
percent. The price decline in the median district was 21 percent. This variation in the size of the
STAR-induced decline in tax price reflects both variation in median house value (V in the above
formulas) and variation in the STAR exemption (X). STAR gives much higher exemptions in
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counties with more expensive homes. The STAR exemption is close to $100,000 in Westchester
County, for example, compared to $30,000 in most of upstate New York. 3
We estimate that the price elasticity of demand for the STAR tax price is -0.57. This
estimate, which is highly significant statistically, indicates that if the STAR tax price goes down
by 1 percent, desired student performance goes up by 0.57 percent. Recall that tax-price decline
in the median district is 21 percent. This elasticity estimate implies, therefore, that STAR boosts
the desired student performance in the median district by (0.57)(21) = 12 percent.
Higher performance requires higher spending, of course, so the STAR price incentive
also leads voters to want to spend more. Some of the extra spending does not boost student
performance as we measure it, which means that it is, with this performance objective at least,
“inefficient.” In addition, higher spending requires higher taxes, so, ironically, STAR, a property
tax relief program, encourages higher property tax rates.
The net impacts of STAR are described Table 1. These impacts apply to 2011, when the
annual cost of STAR was about $3.3 billion. In the median district, STAR resulted in a 3.82
percent increase in spending and a 2.58 percent increase in student performance. The difference
between these two numbers reflects a modest increase in district inefficiency as defined above.
Moreover, the net increase in student performance is smaller than the 12 percent figure given
earlier because higher inefficiency, which is similar to a price increase, lowers desired student
performance.
These impacts varied significantly across types of districts, largely because the STAR tax
shares also varied widely. Performance increased the most in upstate rural districts, for example,
because their property values are very low and the cut in their tax price is correspondingly high.
These performance impacts are slightly equalizing, in the sense that they are larger for poorer
districts, but they are not nearly as equalizing as an equal-cost increase in New York’s
foundation aid program would have been.
STAR also boosted the property tax rate in the median district by 7.93 percent. If the tax
rate before STAR was 2 percent, this result indicates that STAR boosted the rate to 2(1.0793) =
2.159 percent. This increase was much larger in the upstate districts, particularly the upstate Big
Three (Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse). Because these districts receive a great deal of aid
from the state, their school property tax rates are relatively low and the STAR-induced increases
are relatively large in percentage terms.
Perhaps the most striking feature of these simulations is described in the last column of
Table 1. In the upstate Big Three, 77.4 percent of the initial STAR tax savings has been offset
by the STAR-induced increases in property tax rates. Even in the median district over onequarter of the initial STAR tax savings has disappeared.

3

I regard this variation in the STAR exemption as terribly unfair, a subject covered in my May
2012 Column.

Business property is not eligible for the STAR exemptions, so column 3 shows the extent
to which STAR has increased taxes on business property. The results are rather staggering:
STAR, a so-called tax relief plan championed by a so-called anti-tax governor, resulted in a 30
percent increase in the property tax on business property in the upstate Big Three cities.
The impacts of STAR on property tax rates are not likely to grow in the future. As of
2011, STAR caps the increase in a homeowner’s STAR tax savings at 2 percent per year.
Moreover, New York State now has a property tax levy limit. This limit is ill-advised (see my
June 2012 column), but it does minimize tax rate increases in response to the STAR-induced tax
price declines.
Overall, STAR did deliver some property tax relief to homeowners—but a lot less that
promised, particularly in poor districts. Moreover, STAR led to property tax increases on
business property and encouraged school districts to spend more, resulting in small increases in
student performance. These effects were all predictable 4 but were not anticipated by public
officials. Local voters respond to the incentives created by state policies; to avoid unintended
consequences, state policy makers need to recognize this type of response when they design
changes in local taxes or state aid.

Table 1. Impacts of STAR on Sending, Student Performance, and Property Taxes
Region
Exp/Pupil
Performance
Tax Rate
Offset
Downstate Small Cities
3.22%
2.13%
4.68%
19.52%
Downstate Suburbs
2.58%
1.70%
3.64%
20.02%
Yonkers
2.54%
1.77%
6.54%
34.54%
Upstate Big Three
4.55%
3.19%
29.74%
77.42%
Upstate Rural
5.42%
3.68%
22.15%
44.83%
Upstate Small Cities
5.37%
3.67%
19.33%
39.95%
Upstate Suburbs
4.29%
2.90%
11.69%
32.35%
Statewide Mean
4.34%
2.94%
13.85%
34.29%
Median District
3.82%
2.58%
7.93%
28.05%
Notes: Exp/Pupil = expenditure per pupil; Performance = student performance
index; Tax Rate = effective property tax rate; Offset = share of original tax break
offset by property tax rate increase. Source: Eom et al., Forthcoming, Table 8.
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